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Background: To effectively provide public health care for rural residents, the Ministry of Health formally unveiled
the contract service policy in rural China in April 2013. As the counterpart to family medicine in some developed
countries, the contract service established a compact between village doctors and local governments and a service
agreement between doctors and their patients. This study is a rare attempt to explore the perspectives of health
providers on the contract service policy, and investigate the demand side’s attitude toward the public health
services delivered under the contract policy. This evidence from Xinjian County, Jiangxi Province, the first and most
representative pilot site of the contract service, could serve as a reference for policymakers to understand the initial
effects of the policy, whereby they can regulate and amend some items before extending it to the whole country.
Methods: Official documents were collected and semi-structured interviews with human resources and villagers in
Xinjian County were conducted in September 2013. A purposive sampling method was used, and eight towns from
the total 18 towns in Xinjian County were selected. Ultimately, eight managers (one in each township health center),
20 village doctors from eight clinics, and 11 villagers were interviewed. A thematic approach was used to analyze the
data, which reflected the people’s experiences brought about by the implementation of the contract service policy.
Results: While the contract service actually promoted the supply side to provide more public health services to the
villagers and contracted patients felt satisfied with the doctor-patient relationship, most health providers complained
about the heavy workload, insufficient remuneration, staff shortage, lack of official identity and ineffective performance
appraisal, in addition to contempt from some villagers and supervisors after the implementation of the contract service.
Conclusions: Contract service is a crucial step for the government to promote public health services in rural areas. To
inspire the positive perspective and optimal work performance of the health workforce, it is imperative for the Chinese
government to fortify financial support to health providers, adopt an advanced management model and escalate
administrative capacity.
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One key objective of China’s new health reform in 2009
was to improve the equality and dispersal of public
health services. Several policies have been implemented
to counter the negative aftermath of economic reform in
the early 1980s, which seriously undermined the public
health system, especially in the relatively poorer rural
areas. During the economic reform, the central govern-
ment dramatically reduced the financial investment in
health care services, and the rural commune economy,
as the basis of the Cooperative Medical System collapsed
[1]. As a result, 900 million rural residents lost health
insurance overnight, and the barefoot doctors in village
clinics became unemployed. To make a living, they
turned to provide medical services and sell drugs as pri-
vate practitioners and naturally gave up public health
services without any financial support from the govern-
ment. Other public health facilities also focused on the
sales of medical services for profit to offset the decline
in public expenditure on health. In the meantime, the
responsibility to support health services was adopted by
the local governments, and the disparity of economic
status between the urban and rural areas largely im-
paired the health equality [2]. Unlike the richer urban
population who enjoyed relatively complete health care
financed by their local governments, the poor, especially
the elderly, in rural areas suffered from heavy disease
burden [3,4]. The gap in life expectancy between the
richest municipality and poorest province of China was
13 years in 2000 [5]. The gap in the USA was 6.5 years
in 2001 [6] and 2.5 years in the UK in 2004 [7]. There-
fore, the establishment of the New Cooperative Medical
System (NCMS) was the foremost policy in the new
round health reform [8], which covered health insurance
for the rural population and underpinned the revival of
rural health services.
Meanwhile, the central government instituted basic
items of public health services, including the establish-
ment of citizens’ health assessments, health education,
vaccine inoculation and immunization, health protection
of children, maternity patients, and elderly, chronic dis-
eases control including hypertension, type II diabetes,
and severe psychosis, response to public health emer-
gencies, and sanitary supervision [9]. The township
health centers (THCs) and village clinics were obligated
to provide these items and were financed by public
health funding, which was raised by the central and local
governments. However, most village clinics have been
privatized for 30 years, and the awareness of public
health might have faded from most health providers’
minds over such a long time. Consequently, the Ministry
of Health formally unveiled the contract service policy
in April 2013 to assist the organization work of public
health services and change the village doctors’ workemphasis from curative treatment into primary health
care. The Ministry planned to implement this policy in
several pilot sites, and then extend it all over the country
in 2014 [10].
The contract service in rural China can be referred to
as the counterpart to family medicine in some developed
countries [11-13]. It can be defined as contracts en-
dorsed between village doctors and rural citizens in the
household units, which facilitate the doctors in provid-
ing more demand-tailored public health services like
general practitioners. In addition, it is a contract signed
between THCs and village doctors. The THCs are in the
charge of public health funding, and are obligated to
cooperate with village clinics and supervise the behavior
of the village doctors under their jurisdiction.
The level of public health funding has been raised an-
nually. The governments allocated ¥25 (US $4.00) for
each person of service population in 2012 and ¥30 (US
$4.80) in 2013. According to the official regulation, the
THCs are required to allocate no less than 40% of the
money to village clinics. In general, this part of the funding
is divided into two parts. The first part, which accounts
for approximately 70% of the funding, is distributed to the
village doctors regularly. The remainder is assigned by the
THCs to the village doctors on the basis of performance
appraisal of public health practice. Although the public
health services should be provided whether the contracts
exist or not, the Ministry intended that the procedures of
signing the contracts could make both the demand and
supply sides understand their rights and duties in public
health more explicitly and could promote health providers
to commit themselves to public health services under an
effective management and supervision system.
The delivery of public health care under the contract
service provides the rural citizens with free public health
services without imposing any restrictions on them,
except for following the doctor’s advice. In contrast, it
assigns complicated service items to the local health
providers and establish a new relationship between the
village clinics and THCs. The implementation of this
policy would make some changes to health providers,
and they would have some perspectives on it. Awareness
of their thoughts is very important for the policymakers
because health workers are the crucial stakeholders in
any reform process. The contract service could not work
smoothly without their positive cooperation, let alone be
extended to the whole country. However, research into
the perspectives of the supply side on the contract
service has been seldom conducted in rural health
systems. The likely main reason for this problem is that
the contract service policy has not been implemented
experimentally for a long time and the effects of this
policy are not visible. Although the Ministry of Health
selected 15 counties as pilot sites (one in each province),
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months before our investigation. Fortunately, there are a
couple of pilot counties where the contract program has
already in place since 2012. Xinjian County, Jiangxi
Province is the earliest one among the pilot sites, which
was the most important motivation for us to choose it
as the study site.
The purpose of this study is to explore the perspec-
tives of the rural health providers (including both THC
staff and village doctors) on delivering public health ser-
vices under the contract service policy, and investigate
some demanders’ attitudes toward the contract service
as a complement. This study could serve as a reference
for the policymakers to understand the real circum-
stances of the policy implementation, whereby they can
regulate and amend some items before extending it
to the whole country. This qualitative study is suitable to
explore people’s experiences and their direct feedback to
changes happening with them and can be an exploration
for further investigations on the contract service.Contract service in Xinjian County
In addition to being the first experimental site of the
contract service from August 2012, Xinjian County
was selected as the study site for some other reasons.
First, Xinjian is a typical agricultural county with a
total population of 686,800, of whom 79% represent
the agricultural population. Second, the coverage of
health insurance, namely the NCMS, reached 99.99%
in 2013, which was regarded as a solid cornerstone for
the contract policy and public health services. Third,
Xinjian’s economy ranks in the middle range of China.
The per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was
¥44925 (US $7241) in 2013, which was close to the
national average of ¥41027 (US $6629) [14]. Further-
more, Jiangxi Province is a midland area located in the
middle of the Chinese mainland, and its economic de-
velopment is approximately in the middle level for
China. Fourth, the contract service policy has covered
the whole county, and its mode of implementation
fairly complies with the governmental regulation. In
general, Xinjian, a county with a modest background is
suitable to be the study site in many aspects.Methods
Qualitative methods were applied in this study because
they were adept in answering “how” and “why” questions
[15]. We collected official documents related to the con-
tract services in Xinjian County and intended to extract
some data or information from them. Moreover, the
semi-structured interview with human resources and
villagers in Xinjian County were conducted over six
months beginning in September 2013.Sampling
Eight towns from the total eighteen towns in Xinjian
were selected by the purposive sampling method. First,
two towns exemplary in service quality were chosen in
our study. Second, considering that the terrain of Xinjian
County is long and narrow from north to south, we se-
lected six towns with heterogeneity in economic devel-
opment and health service quality in the northern and
southern areas. Every town had one township health
center, and one manager of each THC was selected to
participate in the interview. Then, one village clinic in
each town was selected by random sampling, and all
doctors in that clinic were invited to join the interview.
Patients or voluntary villagers were interviewed conveni-
ently in the village clinics. The study protocol was ap-
proved by the Ethical Review Board of Beijing Normal
University [16].
Data collection
The outline of semi-structured interview for health pro-
viders was derived from framework in terms of job satis-
faction theory [17-21]. In addition to some questions
about personal information, core questions related to
changes brought about by the contract service in aspects
such as income, trainings and promotions, models of
administration, working hours and relationships were
asked. Lastly, we set up some open questions about pre-
and post-comparisons in other aspects and about sugges-
tions for future work. The interview for villagers focused
on their knowledge and attitudes about the contract
service and their behaviors in seeking medical care; it was
simpler than the version for providers because villagers
signed the contract voluntarily without imposing obliga-
tions on them and our study was mainly concerned about
changes happening with the supply side.
Examples of questions to village doctors:
1. What changes have taken place in work content after
signing the contract? Is there any change in working
hours? What do you think about your current
workload?
2. What changes have taken place in the doctor-patient
relationship after signing the contract? What do the
villagers think about the contract? Are they willing
to cooperate with your work?
Examples of questions to THC managers:
3. How do you assign work task of public health
services? Which service items are taken by THC?
What changes have taken place in the workload
after signing the contract?
4. Can the public health funding offset your operating
cost? What changes have taken place in your staff ’s
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satisfied with it? If not, would you tell me the reasons?
Example of questions to villagers:
5. Have you ever heard of contract service? Do you
sign the contract and do you know the content of
public health services?
6. What changes have taken place in the health care
you received after signing the contract? Do they feel
satisfied with it? If so, would you give me some
details? If not, would you give me some suggestions?
Verbal consent was taken from all interviewees instead
of signing informed consent because they had concerns
and misgivings about the interviews. Interviews with
THC staff were conducted in their offices, and those
with village doctors were conducted in their homes to
facilitate open and free discussion by a sense of security,
especially when people intended to discuss some sensi-
tive topics. Interviews lasting for 30 to 60 min were
tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim without any
mark of the interviewees’ names and accurate addresses
to avoid the divulging of their information. Likewise, the
quotations in the Results section only mention the inter-
viewees’ posts.
Data analysis
Based on the thematic analysis approach [22], the
authors examined the transcripts independently with
open coding. First, we sorted out these codes according
to themes manifested in former research and the factors
commonly mentioned by the interviewees. Second, we
generated inductive code, allowing the raw data to be
summarized by our categories. In addition, we ignored the
concepts which had little relationship with the topics we
were concerned and clarified the interaction between
inductive codes [23]. Finally, we made some causal infer-
ences pertaining to the policies of health reform. This
process allowed the authors to identify the scope and rela-
tionships between concepts that grounded the key inter-
pretations and dimensions of the research questions [15].
Results
In total, we interviewed eight THC managers, 20 village
doctors from eight clinics and eleven villagers. The total
service population of the eight THCs was 236,235. The
village doctor interviewees were all males, and twelve of
them were over 50 years old and only one was a licensed
assistant doctor. Through coming into contact with 28
health workers and eleven villagers in Xinjian, we be-
lieved that the data collection achieved “data saturation”
due to the repetition of interviewees’ perspectives. The
data narrated in the following six aspects did reflectpeople’s experiences brought about by the implementa-
tion of the contract service policy.
Workload
In contrast to the old days when they mainly took
responsibility of the medical services for local residents,
all of the village doctors thought that their work burden
had increased by providing public health care and
primary prevention after the contract service was imple-
mented. Everyday medical care had already taken up
most of their working hours. Each of them had the
experience of working overtime for public health care,
ranging from two hours to eight hours a day. The aver-
age service population per village doctor in Xinjian
County was 809, which exceeds the upper limit of 600
recommended by the Ministry of Health for a qualified
general practitioner. In the terms of unlicensed village
doctors, the view was that an appropriate service popu-
lation per doctor should be no more than 300. Village
doctors were confronted with tremendous work pressure,
especially in the clinics with less doctor distribution.
“I often didn’t have enough time to sleep because I
dealt with too many patients during the day, and then, I
have to follow up with the chronic cases in the evening.
As soon as I get home, I find that there is a lot of infor-
mation that must be inputted into the computer. I often
go to bed after midnight since the contract policy was
implemented. As you know, there are 1,700 residents in
our village, and my partner died months ago, but no one
has come to fill the vacancy. I have to treat all of them
by myself”. (Village doctor)
Village doctors had to offer a health assessment to
every villager, manage and follow up on patients with
chronic diseases and input the related data into com-
puters as part of the performance appraisal items. It was
difficult for most of them to operate an information sys-
tem on the computer given their old ages and simple
education backgrounds. They needed to receive skilled
training in computer operation.
“I am already 56 years old, and I am the only doctor in
our village……I am not accustomed to using computers
and always ask my children for help.” (Village doctor)
Not only did the village doctors complain about their
heavy workload, but the THC managers also argued that
the administrative affairs occupied their time. Village
clinics had no equipment or adequately qualified work-
force to undertake the villagers’ physical examinations,
inoculations, child and maternity protection and diagno-
sis of most chronic diseases. Therefore, the organization
work and most public health services were the responsi-
bilities of the THCs.
“We arrange medical cadres with equipment to assist
village doctors many times a year. Meanwhile, imple-
menting propaganda on public health to the villagers
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under our duties”. (THC Manager)
“Most village doctors cannot pass the qualifying exam-
inations, so we organize monthly training activities and
helped them to promote health knowledge and service
ability. In addition, they had to supervise the doctors’
behaviors and work achievements by randomly calling
villagers to ask whether their doctor provided public
health care properly and to verify the computer records
of health assessments”. (THC Manager)
According to the collected documents, public health
services in Xinjian County were fully under way until
2011, and two years afterward the basic items of public
health were instituted by the central government. In
spite of the long term preparations, only 10.45% of rural
citizens had their health assessment archives recorded in
the computer system. This proportion had dramatically
increased to 60.19% in February 2013, less than six
months after the contract service policy was imple-
mented. Combined with the information extracted from
interviews, it indicated that the public health services
represented only a slogan without the contract signing
program. Village doctors did not engage themselves into
providing public health care until they recognized during
the contract procedure that they could receive a certain
proportion of public health funding if they provided the
public health product. They had been private practitioners
and independent of governmental subsidy for decades. The
contract and the remuneration related to public health
attracted them to cooperate with THCs. Naturally, THCs,
as their superior departments and the managers of fund-
ing, began to supervise and appraise their work achieve-
ments. When they settled down to the genuine work,
several problems emerged. The contract service triggered
workload explosions to both doctors and managers and
reflected the lack of and the aging of the workforce. Mean-
while, insufficient remuneration was another important
reason for their complaints about the contract service.
Remuneration insufficiency
All providers implied that their heavy workload demanded
more than what they had gained. The structure of the
village doctors’ income had gradually changed from medi-
cation fees to a more complex constitution composed of
registration fees, compensation for selling essential drugs
with zero markup, and subsidies for the public health
service since 2009. The annual earnings of the interviewed
village doctors ranged from ¥10,000 (US $1607) to
¥28,000 (US $4500). The annual subsidy for public health
per village doctor ranged from ¥4,000 (US $642) to ¥8,000
(US $1286) according to the service population in their
villages. The contract service took up so much time of the
village doctors that it even limited their performance in
medical care, while the payment related to public healthwas disproportional to their workload. Although their
incomes were higher than the net per capita income of
a rural resident in Xinjian (¥7785 or US $1249), they were
much less than that of a factory labor or a migrant worker,
who could earn approximately ¥60,000 (US $9642) per
year. Therefore, it was common for village doctors to leave
their posts to become migrant workers, and their col-
leagues, who actually provided the service in the clinics,
had to share the remuneration equally among them
because the remuneration was distributed to the
doctors in the clinic unit by the THCs.
“I won a certification of merit in our province for my
outstanding work quality (many honorary credentials are
attached on the wall of the consulting room), and I con-
sistently handle my cases with great care. However, after
the contract service, I have to see patients and deal with
information from day to night, while sharing the pitiful
public health payment with my colleague who is in
outside employment and never comes here. I feel so hurt
(tearing). It is unfair!” (Village doctor)
On the THC side, managers also had their own opin-
ions. The annual earnings of THC staff were composed
of a fixed salary allocated by the government and a
bonus with small disparity. The income per month of
approximately ¥2,600 (US $417) was less than that of
some village doctors in clinics with large service popula-
tions. All of them thought that their commitment was
not valued by the government. The public health fund-
ing was considerably consumed as the operating cost.
The staff hardly had incentives to provide public health
care due to the low income.
“Village doctors at least receive the subsidy for public
health after signing the contract, but our staff only earn
a fixed salary. For the sake of funding constraints, public
health funding is withheld from distribution to our staff
and is used to purchase equipment and public health
related consumptive materials, such as posters and
leaflets”. (THC Manager)
Assessment of performance
The standards of the assessment of performance should
be clear-cut and hierarchical through the measurements
of work quantity and quality. However, there were no
guidelines that could be followed by the THCs to allow
accurate evaluation of the performance. Every village
doctor had the experience that their performance related
income was forfeited in the assessment at the end of
year. They wanted to know the reason and demanded
transparency in the evaluation process.
“One hundred yuan was deducted from my perform-
ance related payment last year, while I didn’t know the
reason. They (managers in the THC) only told me that
my score of public health appraisal was less than 90”.
(Village doctor)
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quality appraisal could also be found when there were
three or four doctors working together at the same
clinic in some large villages. The elder doctors often
took accountability for most treatment works for the
sake of villagers’ preferences. However, in the absence
of any effective measurement, they always shared the
payment equally regardless of their de facto work
performance.
“I always choose him as my doctor (pointing at the
oldest doctor in the clinic). I think that he is very experi-
enced”. (Villager)
“The younger doctor in our clinic is mainly in charge
of inputting patient information…… We always divide
the payment and subsidy equally”. (Village doctor)
The managers in the THCs agreed with the statement
that the appraisal on village doctors was not exerted
appropriately. Their explanation was that they were im-
peded to provide transparent and efficacious supervision
by the heavy workload. They also admitted that there
was no effective way to discriminate in the rewards and
punishment of the village doctors, as well as themselves.
The ineffective appraisal could not create any significant
incentives to promote the providers’ performance, but it
did frustrate their work enthusiasm.
“The distinction between the highest and lowest
performance-related payment is approximately ¥100
(US $16) to ¥200 (US $32) per month. No one can gain
incentives from such a little disparity”. (THC Manager)
Identity
The identity as a civil servant (called “bianzhi” in
Chinese) attached with wages, subsidies, endowment
insurance and other welfare, is quite significant to
people who work for the government under the human
resource administration systems of China. All village
doctors worried about their welfare, especially the
endowment insurance, because they were still farmers
and not involved in the official system with the identity
of a civil servant, even though they had already signed
the contract.
“The veterinarians in our village have become official
governmental members for several years. However, as a
doctor, I have not been given the official identity after
signing the contract.” (Village doctor)
Village doctors were still farmers who did farming
work in their spare time and made their fortune from
selling agricultural products or other businesses [24].
However, the contract service demanded the village doc-
tors spend much more time on health care activities
than before. Their income was supposed to mainly rely
on their work as a doctor instead of a farmer. Therefore,
they were eager to ask for the official identity and gain
the pension after they signed the contract.“If I retire at this time, my income will be ¥65
(US $10) per month, and I cannot make a living on
it”. (Village doctor)
The THCs also had an inadequate amount of identity.
For the intolerable low income and heavy workload,
some talented cadres resigned and took their official
identity to their new workplaces along with their wages
and welfare subsidized by the government. To meet the
routine work demand, every THC had the experience of
employing temporary workers to replenish the man-
power. These workers earned lower incomes than official
workers and could not enjoy the state subsidies. Conse-
quently, the low income and heavy workload forced
people to quit their jobs, and then the lack of manpower
resulted in a heavier workload, which propelled workers
in both official and temporary placements to leave their
posts. All of the above took the shape of a vicious circle
and baffled the development of human resources in the
primary health facilities in rural China.
Staff shortage
Managers and village doctors suggested that the staff
numbers were always insufficient, and the heavy work-
load of the contract service made staff shortages more
salient than ever before. In response to the low salaries
and working without identity, some health providers
sought other work to earn money. The rest who were
too old to be migrant workers or not qualified to open
private clinics deteriorated the aging and unqualified
practice of the village doctor. The rural health system in
Xinjian has been confronted with severe talent short-
ages, which had negative impacts on the staff ’s perform-
ance and service quality.
“More and more village doctors have quit their
jobs…… Villagers there have to go to other village clinics
in the vicinity to see a doctor”. (THC Manager)
“My colleague, who holds the certification, has already
gone out and opened a private clinic to make money. I
have to stay here and take care of my old sick wife. I
always feel exhausted, and I have to support my family
with this meager income. I will continue to stick with
the post until the endowment problem is solved (tearing)”.
(Village doctor)
Additionally, managers had their own views on the
issue of workforce shortages, and they thought that the
retention and recruitment of the workforce was not
optimistic in the future. To summarize their opinions,
the first reason was that the government requires village
doctors to pass qualifying examinations, but as most
doctors could not reach the standards, they quit. Second,
the remuneration did not value these health providers.
People could not obtain work incentives and exert their
talents as a doctor in the public health facilities. In
addition, the gap between the cities and countryside has
Zhou et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:75 Page 7 of 11been widening steadily since the Chinese economic
reform in 1978. Young people preferred living in me-
tropolises over staying and working in the countryside.
It was difficult to recruit fresh blood into the rural
health facilities.
Social relationships
Although the staff shortage and unfair low income
accompanied with the heavy workload made providers
feel unable to perform perfectly, the contract service was
a real gratification from the point of view of patients.
The interviewed villagers were patients met in the clinics
or their family dependents. Their average age was 65
and all of them had signed the contract. Except for a
22-year old girl who saw a doctor to get some drugs for
her toothache, the other 10 villagers reported more satis-
factory relationships with village doctors than before.
When signing the contract, they became aware of the
public health services they deserved. Items, such as
home visits, health assessments and follow-ups provided
by the contractors, brought villagers much convenience.
“My father is 83 years old. He never saw a doctor
throughout his life due to poverty. After signing the con-
tract last year, the doctor came to my home and con-
ducted a physical examination for my father. He was
moved to tears at that moment for the considerate ser-
vice”. (Villager)
“When my doctor visited me at home to assess my
health status and establish a health archive for me, I was
diagnosed with diabetes. Thanks to the contract service,
I received early detection and treatment”. (Villager)
THC managers admitted that the village doctors
should be regarded as the indispensable workforce in
public health services because they were familiar with
villagers and could easily gain trust around patients.
However, sometimes the village doctors felt that their
work was not respected or recognized by some villagers
especially the people with few demand for health
services. They did not think they failed to enjoy their
welfare when they were absent from public health ser-
vices such as health assessments and health education,
because the funding of public health was raised by the
governments rather than out-of-pocket.
“I noticed that some villagers even threw out the con-
tract paper as soon as they left the clinic. When they be-
came sick and asked for service items, we had to sign
contract with them again”. (Village doctor)
“I signed a contract, but I have no idea about it and
don’t care it at all. I am young and strong. Health pro-
tection has no business with me”. (Villager)
Some managers also indicated that some patients
raised unreasonable demands and complained to THC
managers about the doctors who did not meet their needs.
The records of complaint would not only influence theyear-end appraisal score but also reduced the doctors’
performance-related payment.
“When the village doctors are busy with their farming
in the harvest season, some patients demand to see the
doctor immediately. If they do not find the doctor in the
clinic, or if the doctors have no time for a home visit,
they will telephone us to complain about the doctor’s
absence from work. I know that most complainants are
not actually urgent cases or bed-ridden, but according to
the appraisal standards, I have to urge the doctors to
act”. (THC Manager)
On the other hand, there were something subtle in the
relationship between village doctors and managers. The-
oretically, the THCs and village clinics are cooperative
partners in accomplishing the public health practices.
However, insufficient remuneration has forced both in-
volved parties into a competitive relationship. THC
managers simultaneously represent both the “athletes”
and “referees” in a sport meet based on their behaviors
in providing public health care and evaluating village
doctors’ performance. Three village doctors implied that
the THCs covertly skimped on their subsidy by impartial
work performance appraisal.
“None of village clinics received 40% of public
health funding last year. The money deducted from
performance related payment were kept by THCs. I
think the appraisal was not reasonable to some
degree”. (Village doctor)
According to the collected documents, THCs approxi-
mately allocated ¥8 for each person of service population
to village clinics as their subsidies for public health in
2013, 32% of the public health funding. The money
deducted from the clinics of poor work performance
were not given to the superior ones. One of THC man-
agers made clear that their staff were dissatisfied with
the funding allocation.
Discussion
This study is the first of its kind to investigate the per-
spectives of the supply side on delivering public health
care under the contract service. Different from most
preceding studies that only focused on village doctors,
our study places emphasis on the THC managers as well.
It is somewhat surprising in our study that the managers
were also dissatisfied with their work conditions. While
most health providers in this study complained about
the heavy workload, insufficient remuneration and over-
look or contempt exhibited by patients and supervisors,
the contract actually facilitated them to provide villagers
with more public health service and forced them to
begin to commit to primary health care. Meanwhile, the
villagers who had received the contract services felt sat-
isfied with the doctor-patient relationship. In developed
countries, general practitioners were commonly inclined
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the patients’ primary health care in a capitation-based
contract [25]. Although rural contractors in Xinjian
might not realize that they were endued with such earn-
est responsibilities, the policy would guide them along
this orientation. Moreover, the contract made village
doctors cooperate with the THCs in providing public
health care and imparted villagers their right to enjoy
free public health. The contract service made a good
start in the coordination between the groups on the sup-
ply side and the demand side, which is significant in the
field of public health [26].
However, the health providers’ negative perspectives
on the contract services and their work circumstances
might discourage the sustainable development of public
health care in the long run. First, the quality of the
health care service depends on health providers in suffi-
cient numbers [27]. An unstable workforce is not condu-
cive for the development of primary healthcare sectors
[28]. Countries with low and middle incomes are con-
fronted with human resource challenges in health care
[29,30], including shortages of qualified staff [31], poor
working incentives and staff absenteeism [32-34]. The
contract service in Xinjian was challenged by these same
problems. The ratio of physicians per 1000 persons was
1.34 in Xinjian County, 1.48 in rural China in 2013. The
ratio of physicians per 1000 persons in mainland China
was 2.04 in 2013 [14]. Although there was no consensus
on the standard of physician density, it could be com-
pared with the USA and UK where health services have
not been in overproduction. The ratio of physicians per
1000 persons in the USA was 2.5 in 2011. In 2012, the ra-
tio of physicians per 1000 persons in the UK was 2.8 [35].
Second, according to our former study of five counties
[16], remuneration as a crucial work incentive for village
doctors averaged ¥21,810 (US $3501) per year, which
was much higher than the net per capita income of the
rural residents at ¥6,977 (US $1120) in 2011 [36]. How-
ever, the findings in Xinjian County indicated that
although their income was higher than the net per capita
income of the rural residents, the village doctors pre-
ferred to compare their income with that of migrant
workers. Thus, they were discontented with the status
quo and intended to change their jobs into more lucra-
tive fields. After all, they had committed most of their
time to providing health services. It was reasonable that
they regarded themselves as more skilled personnel than
peasants.
Moreover, two studies regarding the village doctors’
perspectives on public health in two counties each in
Hubei and Jiangxi provinces [37] and a county in Jiangsu
province [38] indicated that they considered public
health services too heavy for their manpower, the sub-
sidy insufficient and social security absent. According tothe findings in Xinjian, the contract policy had not re-
lieved these problems yet but had increased the health
providers’ burden of work.
Therefore, it could be inferred that if the contract ser-
vice policy were extended, the health providers in most
rural areas would likely suffer from heavy workloads,
shortages of workforce, lack of identity and social secur-
ity and complex social relations, which reflects the na-
tionwide insufficient government expenditure on public
health, thread bare human resource administration sys-
tems and incapacity of managing performance-related
payment. Unlike the health workforce in developed
countries where job satisfaction and retention mainly
rest on professional guidance and trainings, harmonious
relationships with colleagues and patients, family factors
and vocational promotions [39-42], the health providers
of rural China still focused on financial support and so-
cial security. Without sufficient financial and manage-
ment investment from the governments, the retention of
the workforce and quality public health services is not
sustainable.
The financial investment in public health from the
government was inadequate to ensure the smooth oper-
ation of the contract service. Public health care charac-
terized by “public goods” should be supported by
governmental finance. The current under-provision of
public health services in China mainly resulted by the
lack of government funding since the financial reform
was applied in the 1980s [43]. According to the inter-
national experience, the governmental investment in
public health should be no less than 1.5% of the GDP.
However, this proportion in China was approximately
0.75% in 2009 [44]. The contract service imposed the
workload of public health care on health providers with-
out adequate financial support. Their dissatisfaction with
the remuneration led to job abandonment or absen-
teeism, severe staff shortage, and ultimately failure in
providing effective public health care.
Some explanations for the insufficient governmental
investment in supply side of the health system are
described as follows. One reason is that the government
tends to support the demander instead of the suppliers
[45]. The other explanation is that the government
favors infectious diseases control rather than the other
items of public health services [46]. In addition, our
study suggested that the governments preferred subsidiz-
ing village doctors to the THC staff. However, the above
interpretations partially explain the reasons behind the
financial barriers. The primary cause is the absolutely in-
adequate financial support from the government. Health
providers, including village doctors and THC staff, need
more financial support to realize human resource reten-
tion and effective work incentives. The increase of funding
will largely depend on the constant development of local
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on health is mainly determined by local fiscal capacity [47]
under the highly financial decentralization. Provincial gov-
ernments should be the key financing resources because
they have significant autonomy in transferring resources
to county and township governments, who take the main
responsibility for financing health services [48].
Next, the human resource administration in China has
always been bound hand and foot by the official identity.
The official identity together with remuneration and
benefits from the governments were bound to the
worker himself instead of to the specific occupation,
which means that the THCs could not supply adequate
official posts to the new staff because the resigned
worker took away their identity. This administrative sys-
tem is not fit for great fluidity even at Xinjian County.
Likewise, no more identities could be awarded to the vil-
lage doctors. They were subject to an absence of pension
and other social security, which not only had a negative
impact on their income but also made them feel
unrecognized by the government. Our findings sug-
gested that the personnel system should be improved,
which is a huge project not confined to the rural health
system but also over the whole country.
Additionally, some policies regarding the human re-
sources in health care that have been successfully imple-
mented in developed countries might not be applicable
in countries with low and middle incomes [49] due to
the limited capacity to manage such policies. Considering
Xinjian as an example, the appraisal for the work perform-
ance was conducted ineffectively given the staff shortage
and lack of work incentives. The standards of appraisal ap-
peared so obscure that they severely frustrated the staff ’s
motivation. On the other hand, compared with fee-for-
service payments, doctors who were paid by the capitation
fee gained more satisfaction from the demander but pro-
vided a smaller quantity of service [50]. Thus, it is import-
ant to use performance-related payment to motivate
health providers, and policymakers should place emphasis
on formulating logical standards for the appraisal and pro-
moting ability to manage contract services.
On the demand side, while some patients enjoyed
these public health services paid by the governments,
some villagers did not pay attention to these free ser-
vices and did not value the contracting paper according
to the information from the interviews. It could be in-
ferred that while the contract policy might be a proper
way to provide public health care to the rural popula-
tion, the intensity of the propaganda on the significance
of public health and prevention should be enhanced.
Health providers still needed to make further efforts in
the communication with rural residents. Additionally,
auxiliary measures to limit the villagers’ behaviors after
they signed the contract were required.This study has a couple of limitations that warrant
mentioning. Only a precursory investigation into the
demand side was conducted in our study. The conveni-
ence sampling method had selection bias. All inter-
viewed villagers were encountered by us when they
went to village clinics. That is to say, villagers who
doubted or were dissatisfied with the village doctors’
services had little chance to be included in the survey.
Moreover, the simple size of villagers was too small to
determine a fair assessment regarding their attitudes
toward the contract service. A further study would
focus on the perspectives and attitudes of the demand
side toward the contract service, whereby evaluating the
effectiveness of this policy. Second, our study just
focused on one county of the 15 pilot sites. Although,
Xinjian would be a representative sample because of its
economic status and health development ranking in the
middle range of China and its typical characteristics as a
rural county, future investigations will require embra-
cing more sites.Conclusions
This study has displayed findings related to the health
providers’ experience of delivering public health under
the innovative contract service policy on the ground
floor of rural health systems in Xinjian County, a
theme that has not been investigated much in the re-
gion. The contract service is a crucial step for the gov-
ernment to merge the village clinics and THCs into a
cohesive unit and to promote public health care in
rural China. However, village doctors and THC staff, as
the most essential stakeholders in the rural health sys-
tem, have held negative attitudes toward the sustain-
able development of quality public health services
because the contract increased their workload of pub-
lic health care without bringing them reasonable remu-
neration. The village doctors have been regarded more
as peasants than as doctors and still lack official iden-
tity and social security even though they signed the
contract with the THCs. These work circumstances ag-
gregated the workforce shortage and frustrated health
providers in supplying quality public health services.
Thus, it is imperative for the Chinese government to
fortify the financial support to health providers, adopt
an advanced management model and escalate adminis-
trative capacity, thereby inspiring the positive perspec-
tive and optimal work performance of the health
workforce. In addition, the results can assist policy-
makers in amending the contract service policy before
extending it to the whole country and to give political
support to the rural health professionals by providing
them with work incentives and retaining the workforce
in the countryside in the future.
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